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Transnational mobilisation on access 
to medicines: The global movement 
around the imatinib mesylate case and 






Starting in 2006, a patent dispute emerged in India with significant implications 
for global access to medicine. An application by Novartis for a ‘new 
formulation’ patent on the beta crystalline form of the cancer drug imatinib 
mesylate was rejected. Novartis responded by challenging the legality of 
provisions designed to protect access to medicines in India’s patent legislation. 
A global activist movement emerged in defence of these aspects of Indian patent 
legislation mainly because the challenge threatened access to medicine at a 
systemic level, given India’s critical role as a supplier of generic medicines to 
developing countries. The mobilisation described in this paper exploited existing 
activist networks and broader ‘networks of influence’ built during prior 
campaigns conducted around access to antiretroviral drugs. AIDS activists 
consequently played a key role in the global mobilisation around the imatinib 
mesylate dispute, aimed at generating public outrage and political pressure 
against Novartis’s challenge to Indian patent law. A critical ‘broker’ in these 
transnational networks is identified as the medical charity Médicins sans 
Frontières (MSF), and specifically its dedicated medicines access campaign, 
which linked disparate activist groups together, disseminated information and 
mobilised AIDS activists across the world in support of the Indian patent 
flexibilities. In 2013 the Indian Supreme Court upheld the relevant sections of 
the law, representing a significant victory for the international medicines access 
movement. This movement illustrates the power of transnational mobilisation to 
help bring about ‘moral consensus’ and to deploy influence and social power at 
the global level sufficient to overcome substantial corporate power. But we also 
argue that both the emergence of the ‘global AIDS movement’ and the 
emergence of a transnational social movement around the imatinib mesylate 
dispute depended on a set of historical circumstances that are unlikely to persist 
and that the broader medicines access movement therefore faces significant 







From 2005 to 2013 an extraordinary transnational movement was active against 
the patenting in India of the drug imatinib mesylate (specifically: a new ‘beta 
crystalline’ formulation of the drug). Imatinib mesylate is branded ‘Glivec’ and 
‘Gleevec’ by the patent-holder in the US and elsewhere, the Swiss multinational 
Novartis,1 and is unusually effective in the treatment of chronic myeloid 
leukaemia. 
 
In 1999 India had first amended its Patents Act to comply with its obligations as 
a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) (with later amendments 
following and final amendments in 2005). The new patent rules (including the 
final amendments, retroactively) took effect on 1 January 2005, but in the 
interim companies could use a ‘mailbox’ system which allowed for exclusive 
marketing rights to be granted and patent applications lodged from 199 to be 
evaluated from 2005. Imatinib mesylate had been available before 2005 and 
hence was not likely to be given a patent in India. In 2006, the Indian Patents 
Office refused Novartis’s application for the beta crystalline form of imatinib 
mesylate—in part on the grounds that it did not meet the criteria set out in 
section 3(d) of the amended Patents Act which requires that new forms of 
known substances must exhibit enhanced efficacy to be patentable. The 
application was further subject to a ‘patent opposition’ filed on behalf of a 
cancer patients group. Novartis challenged both the Patents Office’s decision to 
refuse patent protection and the validity of Section 3(d) itself in court. This, in 
turn, sparked an international response by health activists and professionals 
concerned that this could threaten the Indian generic medicines industry’s 
continued ability to supply affordable medicines to developing countries across 
the world.  
 
The medical charity Médicins sans Frontières (MSF), and specifically its 
dedicated medicines access campaign, acted as a critical ‘broker’ in the 
transnational networks that constituted the social movement in defence of 
medicines access, by linking disparate activist groups together—including 
groups focused on AIDS, cancer and other diseases. We will attempt to show 
that the pre-existing transnational AIDS medicines access movement provided 
resources, knowledge and ‘bodies on the ground’ in this new campaign, 
activated to a significant extent by MSF’s ability to coordinate activism 
internationally. This transnational network, which was critical in the 
movement’s eventual successes, was by no means an MSF creation, and has 
complex roots, but MSF’s role was nevertheless critical bringing the imatinib 
                                         




mesylate patent dispute to the attention of AIDS and other medicines access 
activists across the world and coordinating their activism, as well as for a 
sophisticated ‘public relations’ campaign against Novartis’s actions. 
 
Militant international health activism (as it relates to access to medicines and the 
impact of intellectual property rights protection on the latter) has its roots in the 
AIDS epidemic and the global struggle for antiretroviral treatment. On the 
surface it seems strange that a substantial transnational movement emerged 
around the obscure legal points of a dispute over the patentability of a drug 
needed by relatively few patients for a disease much less visible than the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic had been. This paper explains why this seemingly unlikely 
movement emerged and ultimately helped defeat multinational corporate power 
with both the patent rejection and a progressive interpretation of the relevant 
provisions in the Indian Patents Act ultimately upheld by the Indian Supreme 
Court in 2013. 
 
 
Activism in support of access to medicines in 
the TRIPS-era 
 
The movements and ‘repertoires of action’ (activist tactics and methods) that 
emerged in response first to the AIDS crisis among North American gay men 
and later the global HIV/AIDS pandemic was probably the most significant 
health-focused social movement the world has seen. A key driver of the 
globalisation of AIDS activism was the fact that antiretroviral therapy was 
unavailable to the vast majority of those in need in the years following the 1996 
discovery that HIV disease could be effectively treated with 3-drug regimens 
(known as Highly Active Antiretroviral Therapy or HAART).  
 
When the AIDS epidemic first became visible among gay men in the United 
States in the early 1980s, community mobilisation was the primary form of care 
and support available to most patients. The gay community had been politicised 
by the struggles over equality (from the Stonewall era into the late 1970s and 
early 1980s). AIDS activism quickly emerged in which groups largely 
composed of gay men organised in order to pressurise the US government, 
research agencies, the drug regulatory body (the FDA) and the pharmaceutical 
industry, in order to ensure adequate funding for research, drug development 
and fast-tracked approvals of promising treatments (see Epstein, 1996). 
 
In 1996 researchers announced the results of studies that showed the efficacy of 
HAART (in which a ‘cocktail’ of three drugs are given to suppress replication of 
HIV), the first truly effective treatment for AIDS. Although new antiretroviral 
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drugs have been developed since then, triple-therapy antiretroviral treatment 
remains the standard of care today. The development of effective treatment 
meant that AIDS became a manageable condition as long as drugs could be 
procured. As a result, the focus of AIDS activism shifted away from drug 
research, development and regulatory approval to access to drugs, with the main 
barrier being the prices of these antiretroviral drugs. At the same time, as Smith 
and Siplon (2006) document, AIDS activism became increasingly globalised, as 
it was in developing countries, particularly Africa, that the vast majority of 
patients were located and the least resources were available to procure and offer 
treatment, thus making affordability of drugs a particularly acute challenge. The 
main impediment to large-scale international treatment provision was the 
unaffordable prices charged by multinational pharmaceutical corporations who 
had developed (often drawing on publicly-funded research) and marketed the 
drugs necessary for effective multidrug treatment regimens (Mrazek, 2002; 
Shadlen, 2004; Kapstein and Busby, 2013).  
 
Activist groups emerged in countries like Brazil, Thailand and South Africa and 
formed links with North American and European activists to form a truly 
transnational AIDS treatment access movement (also see Grebe, 2011; 2012a; 
Kapstein and Busby 2013; Smith et al., 2013). These movements focused on the 
affordability of AIDS treatment. 
 
The pricing policies of the pharmaceutical corporations were made possible by 
intellectual property rights (IPR) protection on pharmaceutical products, 
which—having long existed in the Global North—were being expanded across 
the Global South in the wake of the WTO-administered Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). TRIPS had been 
agreed in 1994 and required WTO members to implement patent protection in 
‘all fields of technology’ (WTO, 1994). A transition period for developing 
countries expired in 2005—with further extensions for least developed countries 
(WTO, 2014). India’s introduction of pharmaceutical patents in 2005 was the 
direct result of its obligations under TRIPS. Prior to TRIPS, countries had 
widely varying intellectual property regimes with respect to pharmaceutical 
products.  
 
Developing countries were compelled to reform their patent laws to become 
TRIPS compliant at the same time that the scale of the HIV epidemic in Sub-
Saharan Africa was becoming clear. TRIPS’s interpretation was contested and 
authoritative precedents did not yet exist. Many countries facing serious 
healthcare challenges were struggling with the question of how to balance 
TRIPS compliance and the need for access to affordable medications. In South 
Africa, a set of amendments to the Medicines Act was challenged by a group of 
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39 pharmaceutical companies in a case that became known as the PMA2 case of 
2000. The reforms in South Africa attempted to provide some safeguards against 
the potentially harmful effects of providing longer periods of patent protection3 
(including allowing for ‘parallel importation’ and generic substitution at the 
point of sale, etc.). The pharmaceutical companies eventually dropped the case 
early in 2001, following strong local and global mobilisation against their case, 
primarily by AIDS activists, and the prospect of patients sick with AIDS 
testifying in court. The case was widely perceived as a public relations disaster 
for the pharmaceutical industry. 
 
The PMA case, together with strong leadership from the Brazilian government, 
strong activist mobilisation and a number of other factors laid the groundwork 
for the Doha Declaration of 2001 (Abbott and Reichmann, 2007; Kerry and Lee, 
2007; Forman, 2008; Nunn et al., 2009), which clarified much of the legal 
uncertainty that had existed around the TRIPS agreement, particularly with 
regard to flexibility in domestic law designed to safeguard public health and 
affordability of drugs. In the declaration, WTO member countries state that: 
 
‘We affirm that the agreement [TRIPS] can and should be interpreted 
and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO members’ right to 
protect public health and, in particular, promote access to medicines 
for all’ (WTO, 2001). 
 
The Doha Declaration constituted a major victory for the global AIDS treatment 
access movement,4 and provided a sufficiently flexible interpretation of the 
obligations of member states under TRIPS to allow the patent law reform in 
India to incorporate measures aimed at protecting access to medicine (much 
more flexible than in South Africa where the legal amendments required by 
TRIPS were made prior to the Doha Declaration). These flexibilities became the 
core issue in the imatinib mesylate dispute. 
 
Global AIDS activist networks comprising Northern and Southern activists 
became extremely active on IPR-related barriers to access to medicine from the 
late 1990s, with remarkable success (see Smith and Siplon, 2006; Nattrass, 
                                         
2 PMA refers to the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers of South Africa, a group mainly 
representing multinational pharmaceutical companies operating in South Africa. These were 
patent-holders on drugs rather than generic drug manufacturers. 
3 South Africa had allowed 16 years of patent protection on pharmaceutical products, but 
TRIPS compelled it to lengthen this period to 20 years. 
4 We frequently refer to ‘the global AIDS movement’—a broader movement trying to secure 
an adequate response world-wide— and ‘the global AIDS treatment access movement’—




2008; Grebe, 2012a; Kapstein and Busby, 2013). It drew on a previously-
existing, but extremely small and limited group of activists for technical 
expertise.5 Its success depended on its relatively unique features of fast and 
flexible network formation, technology-based information flows and its 
incorporation of a diverse set of actors who would not normally be associated 
with social movements (including scientists and clinicians, intergovernmental 
bureaucrats and diplomats, journalists and even technocrats, as well as political 
actors within states) in what can be conceptualised as ‘transnational networks of 
influence’ (Grebe, 2012a).6 In addition, the public health crisis that HIV/AIDS 
constituted, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, created a unique set of historical 
circumstances within which such a movement could attract high levels of 
funding, public attention and exert significant influence. Anand Grover (leader 
of the Lawyers Collective—a key player in the imatinib mesylate dispute—and 
former UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health) says, “Objective 
conditions in the world at that time favoured some sort of deliberate collective 
action.”7 
 
The 2001 ‘Doha Declaration’ formalised the interpretation of public-health-
related flexibilities in TRIPS and prompted significant, sustained activist 
pressure on pharmaceutical companies and states. Following the declaration 
antiretroviral drugs were increasingly licenced for generic manufacturing and 
provided at substantial discounts to developing country governments and 
agencies responding to HIV/AIDS in the worst-hit regions. Without successful 
transnational organisation the remarkable progress that had been made in access 
to treatment would not have been possible (Nattrass, 2014). By 2012, 61% of 
eligible patients in low- and middle-income countries, about 9.7 million people, 
were receiving treatment (UNAIDS, 2013:46). 
 
 
Indian patent law reform in the wake of TRIPS 
 
India is an important global supplier of generic drugs, especially for HIV 
(Waning et al., 2010; MSF, 2014). The development of this industry was made 
possible by the fact that between 1970 and 2005 pharmaceutical products could 
not be patented in India. However, in order to comply with TRIPS, the Indian 
Patents Act was amended in 1999—introducing a ‘mailbox’ system under which 
patent applications could be lodged for evaluation in 2005, and exclusive 
                                         
5 Interview, Ellen ‘t Hoen (27/06/2014). 
6 Similarly, Olesen (2014) has argued for an inclusive definition of ‘transnational social 
movements’ that would accommodate participants in networks not normally thought of as 
‘activists’. 
7 Interview, Anand Grover (24/06/2014). 
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marketing rights issued in the interim—and several times more, including a 
crucial set of final amendments promulgated in 2005. India’s amendments 
ensured that the granting of pharmaceutical patents would occur no earlier than 
the 2005 TRIPS deadline required, likely driven both by the commercial 
interests of its thriving domestic pharmaceutical industry and political 
commitment to affordable medicines. Poor countries throughout the world, 
including in Africa, relied on imported Indian generic medicines, leading to 
India becoming known as ‘the pharmacy of the developing world’.  
 
Aware of the global importance of the Indian generics industry, AIDS (and other 
health-oriented) activists lobbied Indian parliamentarians intensively during the 
parliamentary deliberations on the amendments.8 (The Indian generics industry 
of course also lobbied Parliament with their commercial interests in mind.) A 
key actor in the international campaign to influence the final amendments to the 
Indian Patents Law being deliberated in the Indian parliament during 2005 was 
MSF’s ‘Access Campaign’, which had both local representation in India and 
coordinated global activities through its Geneva headquarters and its many 
country offices. Many activist groups were made aware of the process, its 
implications and connected to Indian activists by MSF.9  
 
On December 17 2004, the World Health Organization sent a letter to the Indian 
minister of Health and Family Welfare noting that a number of WHO member 
countries had expressed their concern that in the future, generic antiretroviral 
drugs from India may no longer be available to them. Citing both the Doha 
Declaration and resolutions of the WHO’s World Health Assembly, the letter 
went on to state:  
 
‘As India is the leader in the global supply of affordable antiretroviral 
drugs and other essential medicines, we hope that the Indian 
government will take the necessary steps to continue to account for the 
needs of the poorest nations that urgently need access to 
antiretrovirals, without adopting unnecessary restrictions that are not 
required under the TRIPS Agreement and that would impede access to 
medicines’ (Kim, 2004). 
 
This letter, signed by Jim Yong Kim (now president of the World Bank) was 
cited in its entirety in the 2013 Supreme Court judgement on the imatinib 
mesylate case. It was a highly significant intervention, given the moral and 
institutional authority of the WHO. It was further significant that a multilateral 
                                         
8 Interview, Leena Mengheney (10/07/2014). 
9 Interviews, Anand Grover (24/06/2014), Ellen ‘t Hoen (27/06/2014), Michelle Childs 
(27/06/2014) and Leena Mengheney (10/07/2014). 
8 
 
body such as the WHO defied United States interests in such an explicit way. 
We believe that this move may well have been made possible or even prompted 
by the global activism about the case which had contributed to an emerging 
‘moral consensus’ around the issue. It is possible that Kim would have written 
this letter even in the absence of the international campaign, but to the extent 
that the WTO and similar bodies were being directly lobbied by activists, this 
may represent an example of how the ‘transnational network of influence’ 
incorporated intergovernmental organisations and exploited their power of moral 
suasion. (Note that these networks need not necessarily be ‘dense’ and are 
conceptualised in such a way that informal linkages and exchanges can 
contribute their formation and effects.) Kajal Bhardwaj—former Lawyers 
Collective lawyer and prominent medicines access activist in India and 
internationally—says: 
 
‘In 2005 there was a massive campaign to preserve India as the 
pharmacy of the developing world … that was really a massive 
international campaign where you had the UN writing in, the WHO, 
every national organisation possible, I believe even the French 
government. 
… 
We had protests and letters from as far as Burkina Faso on this.’10 
 
It is widely believed that the inclusion in the final amendments of Section 3(d)’s 
stricter patentability criteria resulted from this campaign. Section 3(d) prohibits 
the patenting of mere new formulations of known substances unless it results in 
an enhancement of the efficacy of the substance11 (what exactly ‘enhanced 
efficacy’ entails would later become a crucial point of contention in the Supreme 
Court challenge by Novartis to the clause’s interpretation in lower courts). 
Section 3(d) reads: 
 
‘(d) the mere discovery of a new form of a known substance which 
does not result in the enhancement of the known efficacy of that 
substance or the mere discovery of any new property or new use for a 
known substance or of the mere use of a known process, machine or 
apparatus unless such known process results in a new product or 
employs at least one new reactant. 
 
Explanation.—For the purposes of this clause, salts, esters, ethers, 
polymorphs, metabolites, pure form, particle size, isomers, mixtures 
                                         
10 Interview, Kajal Bhardwaj (26/06/2014). 
11 Grover points out that the Lawyers Collective advocated that all new uses not be patentable. 
The eventual decision to allow patents for new uses in cases where increased efficacy could 
be shown was a relatively late compromise. Interview, Anand Grover (24/06/2014). 
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of isomers, complexes, combinations and other derivatives of a known 
substance shall be considered to be the same substance, unless they 
differ significantly in properties with regard to efficacy;’12 
 
The 2005 Indian amendments utilised the clarity and flexibility provided by the 
Doha Declaration and created an intellectual property legal framework that 
would allow for a high level of generic competition in pharmaceutical products 
while remaining TRIPS compliant. It probably represented the most progressive 
interpretation of TRIPS in a major medicine-producing country at the time. Most 
notably, this was achieved through Section 3(d) of the amended Indian Patents 
Act. It was therefore probably inevitable that it would be challenged or tested in 
court. The key legal test of the 2005 Indian amendments, and specifically 
Section 3(d), came in the form of the imatinib mesylate dispute and related legal 
cases. As described below, it was widely recognised that the case would have 
direct implications for the global medicines supply from India. 
 
 
The imatinib mesylate patent dispute 
 
The campaign against the granting of a patent and Novartis’s challenge to 
Section 3(d) was primarily conducted by activists based in India, but received 
substantial support from the global AIDS movement and technical support from 
organisations like Médicins sans Frontières (MSF)—which had (and still has) a 
programme dedicated to medicines access—and Knowledge Ecology 
International (KEI, previously named Consumer Project on Technology), one of 
the most prominent international activist organisations on intellectual property 
rights issues. 
 
The inclusion of Section 3(d) in the final amendments was highly significant: 
Anand Grover—a founder of the Lawyers Collective, who represented civil 
society in the patent opposition to imatinib mesylate—says about the imatinib 
mesylate dispute, “the case was 99% won around the amendments in 2005, and 
particularly 3(d).” He goes on to point out that the advocacy/publicity post-2005 
was primarily about preserving Section 3(d).13 Grover also says, “HIV patient 
networks saw it as an access issue … They are the ones who would actually 
come out on the streets … and that movement was led by MSF.” He further 
notes that the Lawyers Collective specifically left public relations and 
mobilisation largely to MSF.14 
 
                                         
12 India, Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005. 
13 Interview, Anand Grover (24/06/2014). 
14 Interview, Anand Grover (24/06/2014). 
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The dispute arose after Novartis’s application for a patent on the formulation of 
imatinib mesylate in a new beta crystalline formulation under the ‘mailbox’ 
system was refused by the Indian Patents Office in January 2006—on several 
grounds, including Section 3(d) of the Patents Act. Novartis responded by 
challenging the decision in the Madras High Court and, in addition, challenged 
the constitutionality and TRIPS compliance of Section 3(d). 
 
Three distinct legal processes can be identified. These are briefly summarised 
below, before the associated local and transnational mobilisation is described. 
The phases are: (1) the patent application and patent opposition filed by civil 
society; (2) the initial legal challenge to patent rejection and the challenge to 
Section 3(d); and (3) the Supreme Court case revolving around Section 3(d). 
 
(1) The patent application and patent opposition filed by civil society: While 
Novartis filed for a patent on the beta crystalline form of imatinib mesylate in 
India in 1999 (under the so-called ‘mailbox system’), the validity of the patent 
was only assessed after the 2005 amendments came into effect. Generic versions 
of imatinib were already on the market in India by the time the legal changes 
came into force in 2005. The Lawyers Collective, an Indian public interest legal 
organisation, filed a ‘patent opposition’ under the stricter patentability criteria of 
Section 3(d) of the Patents Act on behalf of an Indian NGO, the Cancer Patients 
Aid Association (CPAA). Indian manufacturers of generic medicines also filed 
oppositions to Novartis’s patent application. The patent application was rejected 
by the Indian Patents Office, as explained above. 
 
(2) The initial legal challenge to the patent rejection and a direct challenge to 
Section 3(d): Following the rejection of the patent application in January 2006, 
Novartis challenged the rejection before the Madras High Court. The court 
referred the matter of the patent itself to the Intellectual Property Appellate 
Board (IPAB), which upheld the rejection in June 2009 on the grounds that the 
drug was a new form of an existing substance and was not shown to provide 
superior efficacy (in other words this rejection was squarely based on Section 
3(d) of the amended Patents Act).15 
 
Novartis also argued before the Madras High Court that Section 3(d) itself was 
not in line with the Indian Constitution and fell outside the scope of what was 
                                         
15 Intellectual Property Appellate Board. M.P. Nos 1 to 5/2007 in TA/1 to 5/2007/PT/CH; 





permitted under the TRIPS agreement. In August 2007 the court rejected both 
these arguments.16  
 
(3) The Supreme Court case: In response to the 2009 dismissal of Novartis’s 
appeal by IPAB, Novartis petitioned the Supreme Court of India in August 
2009, essentially arguing that Section 3(d) was incorrectly interpreted by the 
IPAB and that the drug was both novel and had ‘increased efficacy’. Novartis 
argued that ‘increased bioavailability’ met the criterion of ‘increased efficacy’. 
  
Crucially, the court disagreed with Novartis and interpreted ‘increased efficacy’ 
to mean ‘increased therapeutic efficacy’. Novartis had not shown that the beta 
crystalline form of imatinib mesylate had any ‘increased therapeutic efficacy’ 
over earlier forms of imatinib mesylate. The rejection of the patent and the 
validity of a strict interpretation of Section 3(d) were accordingly both upheld in 
the Supreme Court’s April 2013 ruling: 
 
‘Therefore, in the case of a medicine that claims to cure a disease, the 
test of efficacy can only be “therapeutic efficacy”.  
 
… just increased bioavailability [which had been demonstrated] alone 
may not lead to an enhancement of therapeutic efficacy. Whether or 
not an increase in bioavailability leads to an enhancement of 
therapeutic efficacy in any given case must be specifically claimed 
and established by research data. In this case there is absolutely 
nothing on this score apart from the adroit submissions of the counsel. 
 
…it must be held that on the basis of the materials brought before this 
Court, the subject product, that is, the beta crystalline form of Imatinib 
Mesylate, fails the test of section 3(d)… 
 
In view of the findings that the patent product, the beta crystalline 
form of Imatinib Mesylate, fails in both the tests of invention and 
patentability as provided under clauses (j), (ja) of section 2(1) and 
section 3(d) respectively, the appeals filed by Novartis AG fail and are 
dismissed with cost.’17 
 
                                         
16 High Court of Judicature at Madras. Novartis AG v. Union of India (UoI) and Ors.; 
Novartis India Ltd. v. UoI & Ors. W.P. Nos.24759 and 24760 of 2006. 6 August 2007. 
Available at: http://judis.nic.in/judis_chennai/qrydispfree.aspx?filename=11121. 
17 Supreme Court of India. Novartis AG v. Union of India (UoI) and Ors.; Natco Pharma Ltd. 
v. UoI & Ors.; M/S Cancer Patients Aid Association v. UoI & Ors. Civil Appeal No. 2706-




The Supreme Court therefore ruled against Novartis partly on the basis that 
section 3(d) precludes patentability of new formulations unless substantive 
evidence of enhanced therapeutic efficacy can be demonstrated. The principle of 
strict patentability criteria in the case of new uses and new formulations was 
therefore upheld—a key objective of the international campaign.  
 
Throughout these complex legal machinations, Indian and international health 
activists mobilised in support of the patent rejection and against Novartis’s 
challenge of Section 3(d). These health activists included a newly militant 
cancer group, and much of the existing local and international network of AIDS 
drug access activists. During this period the strategies and ‘repertoires of action’ 
developed during the global struggle for access to ART (i.e. the institutional 
memory embedded in the global AIDS movement) were critical success factors 
as was the pre-existing activist networks formed during struggles over AIDS 
drugs. We draw largely on key informant interviews conducted with a selection 
of important actors in the struggle described here as well as documents and 
secondary literature.  
 
The analysis presented in the next sections suggests that both the successes 
recorded by the AIDS treatment access movement in the late 1990s and early 
2000s and, more recently, by the fledgling movement for access to medicines for 
other diseases (including non-communicable diseases, of which the imatinib 
mesylate dispute is perhaps the most significant example to date), were 
contingent upon a very specific set of historical circumstances and the 
deployment of a highly effective ‘transnational network of influence’. Without 
the pre-existing AIDS movement, the struggle over imatinib mesylate would 
likely not have attracted as much international public attention nor have seen 
such high levels of mobilisation. Its status as the first important test case of 
TRIPS flexibilities embedded in Indian law (and India’s status as ‘pharmacy of 
the developing world’) provided an incentive to AIDS activists across the globe 
to mobilise around the case. 
 
 
A global movement emerges and a ‘moral 
consensus’ starts to form in opposition to 
Novartis’s challenge to Section 3(d) 
 
As explained above, the imatinib mesylate case (also referred to as the Novartis 
case), is in reality a number of related cases that came before Indian courts and 
tribunals over a period of seven years following the final amendment of India’s 
Patents Act in 2005. The three central players in the legal and solidarity 
mobilisation story emerge as the Lawyers Collective, the CPAA and MSF, 
13 
 
although a very wide range of activist groups, both within India and globally, 
were mobilised around the imatinib mesylate case. 
 
The Lawyers Collective was founded in 1981, among others by Anand Grover, 
who still leads the organisation. It has been active on medicines access, 
specifically for HIV/AIDS for many years. Grover reports that the Lawyers 
Collective was first alerted to imatinib mesylate as an access issue by South 
Korean cancer activists, who were campaigning against Novartis’s pricing of the 
drug in that country.18 James Love of KEI reports also being approached by 
South Korean cancer groups prior to the Novartis case. KEI had in fact 
conducted some analysis of the Research and Development (R&D) costs of the 
drug, which were being used by Novartis to justify its price.19 KEI had played an 
important role in the global AIDS treatment access movement, particularly in 
providing technical assistance on medicines R&D costing to AIDS groups, 
including to the Treatment Action Campaign during the PMA case in South 
Africa and a later ‘excessive pricing’ complaint against GlaxoSmithKline and 
Boehringer Ingelheim in terms of South African competition law (see 
SECION27, 1998; KEI, 2014). It later became involved in the imatinib mesylate 
case in India, providing analyses which the Lawyers Collective made extensive 
use of. 
 
Imatinib mesylate had been introduced in the United States as Gleevec in 2003 
at a price of US$2,600 per patient per month. It was not on the Lawyers 
Collective’s radar at the time since it did not represent an immediate access 
problem in India, where generic versions were available not long after the US 
launch at under $200 per month (MSF, 2012). But upon being alerted to the 
drug’s high price in markets like the US and South Korea, where it had patent 
protection, it realised both the threat that generic versions would become 
unavailable in India if the patent were approved and, upon analysis, saw that it 
was a relatively ‘easy’ target for a patent opposition since the application was 
for the ‘new’ beta crystalline mesylate form and it therefore clearly fell within 
the provisions of Section 3(d).20  
 
                                         
18 Interview, Anand Grover (24/06/2014). 
19 Interview, James Love (26/06/2014). In South Korea, The Committee For Chronic 
Leukemia Patients and The Joint Committee For Solving the Glivec Problem and Improving 
Public Health Care making submissions to the National Human Rights Committee in 2002 
(BASE21, 2002), calling for compulsory licences (IPLeft, 2003) and issuing calls for 
international solidarity (People's Health Coalition for Equitable Society, 2001). At one point 
Glivec became unavailable during a pricing dispute between Novartis and the South Korean 
government (People's Health Coalition for Equitable Society, 2001). 
20 Interview, Anand Grover (24/06/2014). 
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As lawyers, they needed a client to represent (without which they could not 
directly attack multinational pharmaceutical interests on public interest 
grounds), but were also very aware of having a support and advocacy network 
available, should a test case arise. Grover says: 
 
‘We [India] had to fully comply with Trips by 1st January 2005.21 So 
in 2001 we decided in the Lawyers Collective that it was very 
important that community organisations—and here I want to make a 
distinction between community organisations and civil society 
generally, like NGOs (those who are not directly affected like MSF or 
Lawyers Collective vs., say, positive people’s networks). So we 
started in 2001 to educate the community networks around the country 
about patents.  We found the response was not very good. … But 
within a year or two we received requests from the community to 
continue educating and empowering the networks. Because the 
Lawyers Collective believes very strongly in community networks. … 
 
So by the time we started the [patent] oppositions in 2005 … the first 
opposition was in fact the Glivec case, and we filed it on behalf of the 
Cancer Patients Aid Association, which is a service provider. But we 
had broadened our reach to not only HIV-positive networks but all so-
called patients’ groups … [for] any sort of ailment.’22 
 
Grover is highly complimentary about the CPAA’s willingness to take on, and 
make enemies of, a multinational pharmaceutical company (part of so-called 
‘Big Pharma’), especially in the light of cancer patients groups’ general 
unwillingness to antagonise pharmaceutical companies. Cancer groups are 
generally perceived as non-hostile to pharmaceutical companies because the 
latter are the main funders of the former, and because it might threaten donation 
programmes, which is often the only way poor patients are able to access cancer 
treatment.23 For example, Tomlinson (2012) describes how the South African 
Cancer Alliance (a group of cancer patients’ groups) actively distanced 
themselves from a Treatment Action Campaign-organised march in solidarity 
with the CPAA’s imatinib mesylate case in India.24 When asked why the CPAA 
is more independent of pharmaceutical companies than other cancer groups, 
Leena Menghaney (who was working for MSF’s India office on medicines 
                                         
21 The final amendments to the Act were only made later in 2005, but retrospectively active 
from 1 January. 
22 Interview, Anand Grover (24/06/2014). 
23 Interview, Kajal Bhardwaj 26/06/2014). 
24 A number of informants also made this point about cancer groups’ general unwillingness to 




access at the time and had previously been with the Lawyers Collective), 
explains it largely in terms of individual agency. She specifically credits Y.K. 
Sapru, founder-chairman and CEO of the CPAA: 
 
‘The person who led the CPAA had worked with … Big Pharma 
before, so he knew all their games. He was in some ways very astute 
politically. He very cleverly decided to use the imatinib mesylate case 
to fight the access battle. He was able to distinguish something that 
the HIV movement had early on had a discussion and resolution on: 
“we will not take pharma support, we will not take pharma money, we 
will return all this money they are trying to give us”. I think that 
happened with CPAA. Despite lucrative offers and threats from 




‘With cancer groups it is very hard to get them to come out [because 
the patients are ill]. … Having said that, there was definitely a 
difference between the CPAA and other cancer groups. … the head of 
the CPAA would go to meetings where he would be accused of biting 
the hand that feeds you.’26 
 
The wide and explicit refusal by AIDS activist groups to accept funding from 
pharmaceutical companies is one of the ways in which the AIDS treatment 
access movement had been exceptional. Patients’ groups have traditionally been 
(and for the most part still are) rather quiescent, throughout the world. AIDS 
groups are the exception: in the South they had been politicised by an almost 
complete lack of access to treatment, and in the North by their rootedness in the 
political traditions of the gay rights movement as well as solidarity with 
Southern AIDS groups. 
 
The Lawyers Collective had long been working in the area of medicines access, 
and had identified opposing patent applications as a strategic objective in its 
public interest legal work. So its involvement in a patent opposition under 
Section 3(d) was no accident, although the specific drug chosen was in a sense 
coincidental. In representing the CPAA, it handled legal aspects of the dispute 
throughout the legal processes. However, it deliberately adopted a ‘hands-off’ 
approach to the advocacy and activism surrounding the case, feeling that its 
position as the legal representative of the litigants required it to be seen as 
                                         
25 Interview, Leena Mengheney (08/07/2014). 
26 Interview, Kajal Bhardwaj (26/06/2014). 
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relatively non-political.27 It did, however, recognise the importance of the 
political mobilisation. Much like the Treatment Action Campaign and its legal 
representatives in the AIDS Law Project (later SECTION27) in South Africa, it 
saw legal action and political mobilisation as complementary, recognising that 
the battle in the ‘court of public opinion,’28 including the likelihood that 
multinational pharmaceutical companies and Northern governments would 
lobby the Indian government, may influence the outcome of the case. 
Nevertheless, it left active political mobilisation to civil society partners. 
 
Among these partners were the Indian Network for People living with 
HIV/AIDS (INP+) and a number of other Indian AIDS groups, as well as MSF, 
who coordinated much of the international solidarity campaign through both its 
India office and its global Access Campaign office in Geneva. Keck and Sikkink 
(1998) describe the structure and efficacy of transnational advocacy networks. 
Such networks were crucial in the AIDS medicines struggles, and it was 
precisely these existing networks that MSF leveraged for the case. It is notable 
that MSF is primarily a humanitarian medical organisation, and its Access 
Campaign grew out of its own need to access affordable medicines for treatment 
programmes it was conducting in developing countries. For example, its South 
African antiretroviral treatment project in Khayelitsha (set up in partnership with 
the Western Cape provincial government several years before HAART became 
widely available in that country) worked very closely with the Treatment Action 
Campaign and actively infringed patents on antiretroviral drugs in order to treat 
more patients with the available resources. Similarly, MSF had civil society and 
activist partners in many countries where it worked. Ellen ‘t Hoen, who was 
leading MSF’s Access Campaign at the time, does point out, however, that it 
was a challenge to direct resources towards a cancer drug: 
 
‘It was very difficult for MSF to get involved with cancer drugs 
because MSF was not really involved in cancer treatment, and MSF is 
always very restricted to be vocal about or get involved with diseases 
with which they themselves, as a medical organisation, do not have 
experience.’29 
 
MSF already had an established India office and, even before the imatinib 
mesylate patent opposition was filed, had been coordinating international and 
local lobbying efforts to influence the final amendments to the Patents Act. The 
links between the Lawyers Collective and MSF were strong, Grover, in 
                                         
27 Interview, Anand Grover (24/06/2014). 
28 See Grebe (2011) for a discussion of this aspect in the South African context. 
29 Interview, Ellen ‘t Hoen (27/06/2014). 
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emphasising this link, noted that Leena Menghaney had been working for the 
Lawyers Collective before joining MSF’s India office.30 
 
Informants report that it was not difficult for AIDS activists to see the relevance 
of the imatinib mesylate case, in particular the challenge to Section 3(d), to their 
own struggles. MSF was in many ways at the centre of an established 
transnational network of AIDS treatment access activists, and had strong links 
with the small, but extremely significant, community of technical experts within 
the broader medicines access community. These experts included people within 
MSF’s own Access Campaign and KEI, but also in some others like South 
Africa’s SECTION27. Bhardwaj confirms, “There is clearly a core group, or a 
[small] number of people, who are identifiable, who work on [technical aspects 
of intellectual property rights and medicines access]…”31 
 
AIDS groups throughout the world, but perhaps most notably in India, South 
Africa, Thailand and Brazil, also already had within their ranks a cadre of 
activists well-versed in the challenge TRIPS and intellectual property rights 
protection posed to access to medicines. It is therefore not surprising that AIDS 
activists provided the bulk of activism in support of the patent rejection and 
against Novartis’s various challenges to it and the court cases challenging 
Section 3(d) (and a progressive interpretation thereof), nor that MSF coordinated 
much of this activism. In spite of the difficulty mentioned earlier, then, the fact 
that Novartis was challenging a provision of Indian law of relevance for the 
entire supply of generic medicines to the developing world spurred into action 
both MSF’s Access Campaign and the wider AIDS treatment and access to 
medicines movements. Ellen ‘t Hoen says: “If Novartis had only stuck to strictly 
challenging the decision of the patent controller it would have been more 
difficult for MSF to get involved” and also “This was the South African court 
case all over again.”32  
 
Michelle Childs, who was a senior official in MSF’s Access Campaign during 
the imatinib mesylate dispute, explains that the challenge to 3(d) “really helped 
centralise the idea of India as the pharmacy of the developing world.”33 She 
further explains that the various legal cases we identified above “helped activists 
across the world realise that the legal provisions could be really important.”34 In 
a sense, therefore, the imatinib mesylate dispute—especially the challenge to 
3(d)—became a rallying point that made it possible to exploit and strengthen 
existing networks, but also pulled new participants into the network. Childs 
                                         
30 Interview, Anand Grover (24/06/2014). 
31 Interview, Kajal Bhardwaj (26/06/2014). 
32 Interview, Ellen ‘t Hoen (27/06/2014). 
33 Interview, Michelle Childs (27/06/2014). 
34 Interview, Michelle Childs (27/06/2014). 
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describes how significant efforts and resources were expended on disseminating 
information about the imatinib mesylate dispute and its significance, including 
through the organisation of countless workshops and meetings with AIDS and 
health activist groups across the world, as well as translation of technical and 
legal information into digestible form aimed at non-expert activist audiences. 
Anand Grover points to the access of the Indian actors to a global network of 
AIDS activists as something of great significance. These were largely facilitated 
by MSF. Grover says, “We had an international fraternity. (…) We’d give out a 
call and groups like TAC [and others] would respond.”35 
 
In December 2006 MSF launched a ‘Drop the Case’ campaign—which called on 
Novartis to drop their two court actions before the Madras High Court. 
According to MSF the ‘Drop the Case’ petition was signed by 450 000 people—
including archbishop Desmond Tutu. Even though Novartis did not drop the 
case, the campaign likely played an important role in increasing public 
awareness of the case. It should be noted that this campaign was never truly 
aimed at persuading Novartis to withdraw its court action, but rather at 
influencing public opinion. Ellen ‘t Hoen says, “I was glad that Novartis didn’t 
drop the case, and am extremely glad that [after they lost the case] this 
jurisprudence now exists.”36 
 
To summarise: AIDS activism provided a critical resource for the successful 
mobilisation around imatinib mesylate. First, AIDS activists mobilised around a 
cancer drug, because existing networks facilitated wide understanding of the 
case’s significance, particularly in the light of the challenge to Section 3(d). 
Second, the existence of well-developed AIDS-related activist networks 
provided an ‘infrastructure for mobilisation’ that could be rapidly activated to 
provide resources for the channelling of information, influence and social power 
(in what we term ‘transnational networks of influence’ since they stretch wider 
than networks only of activists, see Grebe, 2011; 2012a). Third, the ‘repertoires 
of action’ embedded in the institutional memory of the global AIDS movement 
provided inspiration for the mobilisation around the imatinib mesylate dispute 
(see below). 
 
In part because of the work of MSF and others and the court proceedings in 
India, the imatinib mesylate case reignited international public debate about the 
potential of intellectual property protection to restrict access to medicines—and 
therefore an emergent ‘moral consensus’ that patent protection enabling the 
unaffordable pricing of life-saving drugs was unacceptable. In August 2007, Dr 
Brian Druker, one of the key researchers involved in the discovery of imatinib 
                                         
35 Interview, Anand Grover (24/06/2014). 
36 Interview, Ellen ‘t Hoen (27/06/2014). 
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mesylate, wrote an open letter in which he questioned the way in which patents 
were blocking access to the drug: 
 
‘… the price at which imatinib has been offered for sale by Novartis 
around the world has caused me considerable discomfort. 
Pharmaceutical companies that have invested in the development of 
medicines should achieve a return on their investments. But this does 
not mean the abuse of these exclusive rights by excessive prices and 
seeking patents over minor changes to extend monopoly prices. This 
goes against the spirit of the patent system and is not justified given 
the vital investments made by the public sector over decades that 
make the discovery of these medicines possible’ (Druker, 2007). 
 
It was significant (and reminiscent of the period during which access struggles 
over AIDS drugs were being pursued) that this kind of comment appeared in 
major newspapers and international forums. The claims of the access to 
medicines movement—revolving around the central moral assertion that the 
need for access to medicines and the suffering of patients who are denied access 
overrides the well-established property rights of patent-holders (and perhaps that 
medicines as a life-saving commodity in a certain sense represents a public 
good)—are fairly radical and challenge the interests of a massive and influential 
industry in the Global North (see Smith and Siplon, 2006; Nunn et al., 2009; ‘t 
Hoen et al., 2011; Kapstein and Busby, 2013).  
 
It is therefore not simply a question of directly contesting corporate power, but 
of a symbolic struggle in which the main objective is to generate a public sense 
of moral outrage. Actual street protests and other tactics of political contestation 
were more important for their symbolic impact in a ‘public relations war’ and in 
generating public attention and winning public support for the moral claims. 
‘Framing processes’ (often taking the form of framing claims in terms of 
fundamental human rights) and the idea that ‘new social movements’ tend to 
pursue consensus around ideas and norms that go beyond a simplistic 
economistic notion of their ‘interests’ (see Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Taylor, 
2004) are by no means new in the social movement literature. Nevertheless, we 
find it useful to refer to these general processes and the specific forms it took in 
the AIDS and medicines access movements collectively as the ‘politics of moral 
consensus’ (see Grebe, 2011; 2012a). 
 
In a New York Times editorial published three days after the Supreme Court 
judgement, the paper argued that “The ruling is important … because it 
establishes a limited precedent that requires drug companies to show real 
improvements in efficacy before they can get patent protection on updates to 
existing drugs in India” (NYT, 2013). The editorial also rejected Novartis’s 
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argument that such a ruling would decrease the incentive to invest in research 
and development of new medicines. Notably, it concluded with the comment 
that the ruling could “help poor patients get drugs at prices they can afford while 
preserving an incentive for true innovation” (NYT, 2013). 
 
The types of activist actions undertaken both within India, and internationally in 
response to MSF’s calls to action show striking similarities to the activities 
undertaken by AIDS activists during earlier campaigns over access to 
antiretroviral and other drugs for AIDS patients (note that these respective 
actions often involved many of the same people). During court proceedings, 
activists would demonstrate outside court, just like TAC demonstrated outside 
court during the PMA case and their later case in the South African courts that 
compelled the government to provide antiretroviral drugs for the prevention of 
mother-to-child transmission of HIV (see Grebe, 2011). Global days of action 
would result in (joint and separate) actions by AIDS groups across the world. As 
an example of how taking court action on behalf of patients, demonstrating 
outside court and mobilising local and global solidarity had been used in the 
AIDS movement and became part of its ‘repertoire of action’ is provided by 
TAC’s mobilisation during the PMA case. This joint statement issued on 6 
March 2001 is representative of the model of mobilisation widely used during 
these struggles: 
 
‘National and international organizations today welcomed the South 
African High Court's decision to accept evidence from the Treatment 
Action Campaign (TAC), which represents people living with HIV. … 
TAC will give evidence about how brand name medicines are 
unaffordable for millions of people living with HIV in South Africa. 
 
“For the first time, the pharmaceutical industry will have to justify to 
South Africa and to the world why their drug prices are so high and 
why their patents should be so aggressively protected, when millions 
of people are dying and cheaper drugs exist,” said Zackie Achmat, 
chairperson of the Treatment Action Campaign. 
 
This follows a week of worldwide demonstrations in support of the 
South African government, and calling on companies to drop the case. 
Thousands of people from unions, churches, NGOs and people living 
with HIV/AIDS took to the streets in Pretoria, Cape Town, and 
Durban’ (Authors’ emphasis. TAC, 2001). 
 
An example from the imatinib mesylate dispute is that on February 22, 2012 (on 
the eve of a Novartis board meeting) activists across the world responded to an 
MSF call for a global day of action. Act Up-Basel, Act Up-Paris, the Asia 
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Pacific Network of Positive People (APN+), Berne Declaration, Health GAP, 
International Treatment Preparedness Coalition (ITPC) and Oxfam International 
released a joint statement on their ‘48 Hours of Action’ of 22-23 February that 
stated: 
 
‘Swiss Multinational Pharmaceutical company Novartis is continuing 
its tradition of suing developing country governments for their pro-
health patent laws. In 1999, Novartis along with other pharmaceutical 
companies sued the South African government over pro-health 
amendments in their patent law. 
  
Since 2006, they have been suing the Indian government over the 
health safeguards (Section 3d) in its patent law. India supplies generic 
medicines across the developing world and health and PLHIV groups 
in India have been using Section 3(d) of the Indian law to ensure that 
key medicines stay off-patent. Novartis did not get a patent in India on 
a cancer medicine and wants this law (Section 3d) weakened. BUT 
THIS WILL IMPACT ALL OTHER GENERIC MEDICINES AS 
WELL’ (Act Up-Basel, et al., 2012).  
 
Another example is that while final arguments were being heard by the Indian 
Supreme Court in 2012, a march in support of the Indian government was 
organised in Cape Town and attended by activists from TAC, MSF and 
delegates attending the global People’s Health Assembly (coincidentally taking 
place in Cape Town at the time). Together with MSF South Africa, TAC 
released a media statement titled “Why does a court case in India matter for 
South Africa?” The statement was clear on the global implications of the case: 
“A Novartis victory will not only stymie access to life-saving generic 
[medicines] across southern Africa, but will also result in a negative precedent 
for countries facing a high burden of disease like South Africa” (TAC and MSF, 
2012). 
 
These and many similar actions show quite clearly how the institutional memory 
embedded in the Global AIDS Movement and the ‘repertoires of action’ that had 
developed over more than a decade of global AIDS treatment activism (and even 
the earlier activism of Act Up and similar groups in the 1980s and 1990s) were 






The vulnerability of the global medicines 
access movement 
 
A notable aspect of the social mobilisation around the imatinib mesylate dispute 
is the extent to which it was sustained amidst challenging conditions.  
 
For example, a rupture occurred within the access to medicines movement 
regarding voluntary licenses negotiated by the Medicines Patent Pool. There was 
significant disagreement among activists over whether to ‘compromise’ by 
negotiating with pharmaceutical companies as a pragmatic way to ensure access 
to medicines in regions and countries with critical needs or whether to ‘hold out’ 
and seek a renegotiation of the global intellectual property rights regime.37 
Nevertheless, these disagreements over voluntary licences seem to have had 
little impact on solidarity regarding the imatinib mesylate case, perhaps because 
voluntary licences and the patent pool was a sufficiently separate issue that 
activists were able to set aside their differences in joint recognition of the 
importance of (and their shared interests in) the imatinib mesylate dispute. 
 
Kajal Bhardwaj notes that it was difficult to sustain activist momentum in the 
final phase of the dispute, when the Supreme Court was considering mostly the 
appropriate interpretation of Section 3(d), rather than the constitutionality and 
TRIPS compliance of 3(d) itself. But she adds: “It did get sustained, because of 
collective consciousness”.38  
 
This chimes with previous findings suggesting that the transnational networks 
constituting the global AIDS movement often enabled ad-hoc and temporary 
coalitions constructed when the claims and interests of particular actors 
converged. Pre-existing networks (with varying levels of density, and strength of 
links) enabled the quick construction of these ad-hoc coalitions that were not 
dependent upon full alignment of purpose or long-term alliances. It was 
characteristic of this movement that more and less radical actors often 
cooperated on some issues but diverged on others (see Grebe, 2011; 2012a). 
 
This ‘collective consciousness’ was probably stronger among actors that formed 
part of longer-term networks and coalitions and manifested in remarkable ways. 
(This ‘collective consciousness’ can be thought of as a strong form of what we 
earlier described in terms of collective action, or simply acting in line with 
common interests, aimed at contributing to the emergence of ‘moral 
                                         
37 Interviews, Anand Grover (24/06/2014); Kajal Bhardwaj (26/06/2014). 
38 Interview, Kajal Bhardwaj (26/06/2014). 
23 
 
consensus’.) An example is the march in Cape Town described in the previous 
section. 
 
But, despite the significance of the victory, the medicines access movement was 
not on a strong footing at the end of the imatinib mesylate dispute. The broader 
medicines access movement (beyond AIDS drugs) is in some senses in its 
infancy, relatively small and under resourced. Apart from the imatinib mesylate 
dispute, it has had few high profile victories outside of antiretrovirals. Historical 
conditions have changed and become less favourable to medicines access 
activism. Anand Grover says, “We are on a weaker footing than we were on 
with HIV and it will be an uphill task [from now on]...”39  
 
Funding for activism on medicines access has been drying up, and institutional 
memory is being lost. James Loves says. “A turning point was 2007.” Four 
foundations were funding work on intellectual property rights. “We thought it 
was so easy to raise money.” He sees the agreement on the World Intellectual 
Property Organisation’s Development Agenda in 2007 as a turning point. The 
Development Agenda was supposed to bring greater balance to a historically 
very-pro-IPR institution. Within 24 months, three of the four main foundations 
funding civil society activism on IP issues (the MacArthur, Rockefeller and Ford 
foundations) had stopped doing so.40 Grover further says, “After the Gleevec 
case some of our people left …. to preserve that memory institutionally is a very 
big challenge.”41  
 
One of the resources the AIDS movement and (the smaller) broader medicines 
access movement provided, was an inter-connected community of technical 
experts. But, this technical expertise is concentrated in a relatively small 
community of professional IPR activists and activist lawyers (in organisations 
like the Lawyers Collective, KEI, MSF, TAC, SECTION27 and a few others). 
The recent and continuing decline of the global AIDS movement (see Grebe, 
2012b) and the concentration of this expertise, renders the continuing 
availability of this resource vulnerable. 
 
Pharmaceutical companies have further been adapting their tactics,42 Northern 
governments have also been using Free Trade Agreements to impose ‘TRIPS+’ 
provisions on weaker Southern states, resulting in a further strengthening of 
pharmaceutical IPR protection. Unless the remnants of the transnational activist 
network can successfully adapt to these changed circumstances, including by 
tactical and strategic adaptation, attracting significant financial resources and 
                                         
39 Interview, Anand Grover (24/06/2014). 
40 Interview, James Love (26/06/2014). 
41 Interview, Anand Grover (24/06/2014). 
42 Interview, James Love (26/06/2014). 
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rebuilding a moral consensus, movements like that which emerged around the 





The historic conditions in which the global AIDS movement arose, had several 
fortuitous elements that made its success possible. For example, the 
characteristics of HIV/AIDS itself are unusual (patients survive and can be 
politically active for relatively long periods, even without treatment). AIDS was 
first recognised in the politicised North American gay community, which 
allowed a politically astute and radical activist movement to emerge almost 
immediately (see Epstein, 1998; Smith and Siplon, 2006). The South African 
epidemic exploded shortly after democratisation, providing unique opportunities 
for human rights-based activism. Further, an Indian generics industry existed, 
which provided the material circumstances in which the global AIDS treatment 
access movement could achieve substantial successes. Similar historical 
conditions do not exist for the fledgling broader medicines access movement: 
the international trade and IPR regimes are being strengthened in ways that may 
make similar battles more difficult in future (for example through bilateral and 
multilateral Free Trade Agreements outside the WTO that contain ‘TRIPS+ 
provisions’). Thus, as argued in the previous section, the victory represented by 
the imatinib mesylate case itself and subsequent progress in the development of 
a strong broader medicines access movement (beyond AIDS drugs) remains 
under threat. 
 
As we have attempted to show in this paper, the relatively successful global 
AIDS treatment access movement provided resources, including ‘transnational 
networks of influence’, ‘repertoires of action’, repositories of expertise 
(particularly technical expertise on IPR law and pharmaceutical research and 
development), institutional memory and ‘bodies on the ground’. The movement 
that emerged around the imatinib mesylate dispute drew on these resources and 
exploited existing AIDS-focused networks around a new medicines access issue. 
This was likely critical to its success. Like the AIDS movement, it also relied on 
individual agency (many examples could be cited, but Grover and Sapru are 
significant) and the ‘politics of moral consensus’ to overcome Novartis’s 
substantial public relations campaign, the tacit support of some Northern 
governments and the resources Novartis could pour into its legal struggle. One 
should acknowledge, however, that the ‘moral consensus’ that emerged over the 
injustice of patented drugs priced outside the reach of poor patients (and their 
governments) was not purely the product of activism. An argument that seems to 
have resonated widely, including in institutions like the WHO and among 
journalists at influential newspapers etc.—representing what we call a ‘moral 
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consensus’—also became a ‘resource’ that the social movement exploited in 
addition to being produced by its actions. 
 
The imatinib mesylate dispute represents a rare example of mainly Southern 
civil society groupings (albeit with significant resources channelled via MSF, a 
prominent Northern NGO, and drawing on Northern expertise such as that in 
KEI) managing to neutralise the influence and power of a multinational 
corporation. It can be seen as a case of both South-South and South-North 
activist and ‘influence’ networks constructing and drawing on a ‘moral 
consensus’—resulting in a victory of a transnational social movement over 
multinational corporate power. This kind of victory is rare. The resources, 
including existing networks and institutional memory, of the AIDS movement 
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